We examine the effects of defensive weapons and their interaction with preemption. In a complete information setting, where attacks only occur as a consequence of predatory incentives, a unilateral acquisition of defensive weapons always destabilizes. Under strategic risk, where players might launch preemptive strikes, defensive weapons can help sustain peace. However, this only happens when such defensive systems are much more effective against a sneak attack than in an open war. Otherwise, defensive weapons are likely to also be destabilizing. We contrast these results with the effect of signing defensive alliances, which unambiguously bolsters the prospects of peace in both strategic settings.
Introduction
In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush ordered the deployment of a missile defense system. Such move triggered vociferous international concerns. Most forcefully, Russia and China have recently issued a joint statement condemning U.S.A. plans and accusing this unilateral deployment of being a destabilizing move. 1 Indeed, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty banned the development of a defensive system, which suggests that the signatories agreed that these systems might have destabilizing effects. However, it is not clear why such defensive weapon deployment should threaten potential opponents as they do not provide any offensive advantage and only serve to reduce the damage that an incoming strike would cause.
In this short article we examine the effect of defensive weapons in a conflict framework developed in Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2008) . This framework allows for a nuanced analysis of the mechanics of deterrence because it neatly separates two distinct motives for upsetting the peace. First, there is a predatory incentive to attack insofar a contender might obtain an advantage by attacking a peaceful opponent. Second, there is a preemptive motive to attack insofar as attacking is a best response to expectations that the opponent is indeed planning for war. In the analysis of this framework under complete information, only predatory incentives matter. However, slightly modifying the game to introduce strategic uncertaintyà la Carlsson and van Damme (1993) introduces a role for the preemptive motive. (2008) we show that the deterrent effect of accumulating offensive weapons behaves quite differently in these two strategic scenarios.
In Chassang and Padró i Miquel
To examine the effect of defensive weapons, we analyze the case of two symmetric countries. When one country unilaterally acquires a defensive system, peace is unambiguously more difficult to obtain under complete information. If this country launches a surprise attack, the defensive system will shield her from all the future retaliatory strikes by the victim. Therefore, the benefits from the sneak attack are unchanged, but its costs are diminished, which unambiguously increases the predatory incentives of the contender that deploys defensive weapons. Since under complete information preemptive motives play no role, there is no other effect that can mitigate this and the destabilizing effect is unambiguous.
Intuition suggests, however, that the main beneficial effect of defensive weapons is that they allow contenders to be at ease. Such weapons reduce the damage that a surprise attack causes and therefore reduce the urge to launch preemptive strikes. Clearly, this intuition can only be true in a model with preemptive motives for launching an attack. When we analyze the results under strategic risk, we find that this is, indeed, the case: preemptive motives for conflict are diminished by the deployment of a defensive system. However, this reduction is small as it is limited to the first round of combat because the effect of defensive weapons in subsequent rounds is independent of who started the war. This small reduction is therefore likely to be overwhelmed by the increase in predatory incentives described above, that also occurs under strategic risk. As a consequence, unless defensive weapons are unrealistically more effective against a first strike than in a situation of open war, deploying a defensive system can undermine the prospects of peace even under strategic risk.
The basic reason for these disappointing results is the inability to decouple the defensive effect against a surprise attack from the defensive effect in any other case of war. We show, however, that a common defensive arrangement has the capacity to impact these payoffs differently and can, therefore, unambiguously increase stability. Specifically, a treaty by which countries agree to militarily help each other only in the case in which they suffer an attack serves to reduce preemptive incentives leaving predatory incentives fixed. NATO is a prominent example of such defensive alliances. We consider two groups i ∈ {1, 2} that play an infinite horizon repeated game, with discrete time t ∈ N, and share a common discount factor δ. Each period t, the players simultaneously decide whether to be peaceful (P) or to attack (A). The stage game payoffs are as follows:
where payoffs are given for row player i. The peace payoff,π t , is an i.i.d. draw distributed according to some distribution g. When any of the players attacks, there is conflict and the payoffs depend on who attacked first and who possesses defensive weapons.
indicates whether player i possesses such weapons. We take the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (First Strike Advantage) For all defensive weapon configurations d i and
Assumption 1 states that there is an advantage in attacking first and that there is a preemptive motive for war as the payoffs from a simultaneous attack dominate those from being a second mover. To introduce the effect of defensive weapons such as missile defense systems or bunkers, we consider the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Defensive Weapons) Consider the following payoffs: attack. For notational simplicity, we will call f (0, 0) = f , w(0, 0) = w, and s(0, 0) = s.
We focus on grim trigger strategies once there is an attack. Any equilibrium in such strategies, is also an equilibrium of an exit game. In the exit game structure, as long as both players play P , they obtainπ t and the play moves to t + 1. If any of the players deviates, then the game stops and players obtain the final payoffs F , W , or S as a function of who attacked first. Therefore, flow payoffs are as follows:
where
This is a particular case of Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2008) in which we study the sustainability of peace under two contrasting information settings described below.
Complete Information versus Strategic Risk
Complete Information: This corresponds to the setting where g is distributed according
to d π , a point mass on π. We denote Γ CI this complete information game in which returns from peace are fixed and common knowledge. by Γ σ,g . For comparative purposes, we are interested in the properties of game Γ σ,g when its payoffs and information structure become arbitrarily close to those of the complete information game Γ CI with constant benefit π. Therefore, we consider a sequence of distributions {g n } n∈N such that for all n ∈ N, g n has support (−∞, +∞) and {g n } n∈N converges in mean to d π , the degenerate distribution that puts a unit mass at π.
We are interested in the equilibrium properties of Γ σ,gn as first σ → 0 and then n → ∞.
Analysis
Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2008) show that the equilibrium structure of both Γ CI and the appropriate limit of Γ σ,gn is closely related to the equilibrium structure of the following simple static game G under complete information and under a global games perturbation.
is always a Nash Equilibrium of game G. We are interested, however, in the payoff configurations that make permanent peace sustainable. We have the following results. An advantage of this static representation is that it provides stark intuition on the two motives for attack that exist in this setting. First, a player might want to forego Π and attack a peaceful opponent in order to obtain F (d i , d −i ). We call this the predatory incentive to attack. Second, a player that expects to be attacked, wants to attack in order to obtain
We call this the preemptive incentive to attack. By contrasting the two strategic settings, we can separate the effects of both types of incentives.
Defensive Weapons and the Sustainability of Peace
In this section we analyze the effect of a unilateral acquisition of defensive weaponry starting from a situation of symmetry between contenders.
Defensive Weapons under Complete Information
It is an immediate corollary of Proposition 1 that perpetual peace is attainable under com-
(1) 
This is a strong and counterintuitive result. Under complete information, this result implies that defensive weapons increase predatory incentives, F − Π. To gain intuition, we can divide the payoffs obtained from a predatory attack, F , in two components. First, there is the immediate gain from the surprise strike, f . Second, there is the retaliatory war that follows, which yields δ 1−δ w to the attacker. Acquiring defensive weapons does not change the former, but it increases the latter by an amount δ 1−δ µ thereby increasing the temptation to attack. Intuitively, the problem is that any weapon that can shield a contender against a predatory attack from her opponent, can also shield an aggressor against retaliation from the victim. Since this potential retaliation was necessary to deter predatory strikes in the first place, acquiring defensive weapons can destabilize the peace by reducing the costs of deviating. Inevitably, an agent armed with defensive weapons becomes more aggressive.
Defensive Weapons under Strategic Risk
The previous section shows that defensive weapons are destabilizing when there is no strategic risk. However, we might intuitively think that the main benefit of defensive weapons is reassurance. A contender that has deployed defensive weaponry is better shielded from predatory strikes and therefore should have diminished incentives to launch preemptive strikes.
In complete information, this benefit will not be taken into account because preemptive incentives play no role in determining the sustainability of peace. The setting with strategic risk, however, allows us to add the predatory motive for conflict to the analysis to examine whether this conjecture holds.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 2 implies that peace is sustainable under strategic risk if and only if
Note that the left hand side of the inequality is the product of the predatory incentives of both players, while the right hand side contains the product of preemptive incentives.
Intuitively, even at the limit with almost no noise, the setting with strategic risk makes players wary of suffering a surprise attack. Hence, they take into consideration how much they would gain by launching a preemptive strike. This thinking spirals, making peace more difficult to obtain than with complete information and, more importantly, introducing preemptive incentives in the determination of the sustainability of peace.
) of the second degree equation defined by condition (3) taken as an equality. This is again the minimum return to permanent peace that is necessary for war to be avoided. Note that we always have that 
Then, we have
By comparing Proposition 4 to Proposition 3 we see that adding the preemptive motive for conflict to the analysis helps the argument for defensive weapons. In particular, in contrast with the complete information case, under strategic risk there is a chance for defensive weapons to have a stabilizing effect. For this to be the case, however, defensive weapons have to be disproportionally effective in the first round of combat. To see this, note that equation (4) implies that a stabilizing defense system requires:
Unfortunately, as δ approaches 1, this condition is impossible to meet. Therefore, for sufficiently patient players, defensive weapons will be destabilizing even under strategic risk.
To understand why this is the case, it is helpful to separate the different effects that defensive weapons have in the setting with strategic risk.
First, as in the case with complete information, the side that deploys the system increases her predatory incentives. The reason is again that the first period strike payoff, f , is not affected, but the retaliatory period payoffs are augmented by
µ. This is clearly a destabilizing effect. Second, under strategic risk it matters that the predatory incentives of the player that does not have defensive weapons are reduced. In particular, if she attacks, her first period surprise payoff is now reduced by µ f . Since this effect reduces the product of predatory incentives, it is beneficial.
Third, we need to analyze what happens to the preemptive incentives of the side that obtains the defensive system. This is the effect that intuition predicts should be strong and stabilizing. However, it is easy to see that
In other words, preemptive incentives are only reduced by the difference in payoffs in the first round of combat. The reason for this is similar to the problem that arises for predatory incentives: as the war develops, these effectiveness of defensive weapons does not depend on the identity of the first attacker. Hence, any effect after the first period of combat is washed out because it does not depend on whether the player was taken by surprise or the war started with a simultaneous attack.
The consequence of the reasoning above is that the two stabilizing effects, µ f and µ s , only occur in the first period of combat, while the pernicious effect on predatory incentives unfolds in every period of the retaliatory war. This is the logic of expression (5). The more players care about the future, the higher is the importance of the retaliatory war and therefore the more destabilizing defensive weapons will be.
The Problem with Defensive Weapons
Under strategic risk, defensive weapons have a greater chance of being a stabilizing force, but they are still certainly not guaranteed to be beneficial. The protective effect of defensive weapons remains in place during the retaliatory war that opens after the first strike is launched. As a consequence, such weapons inevitably affect F , W and S simultaneously.
Since this protective effect during retaliation is not conditional on who started the war, defensive weapons increase predatory incentives, and do not diminish preemptive incentives as much as casual intuition would expect.
Therefore, for a security arrangement to be unambiguously stabilizing in this setting, it needs to affect F , S and W independently. Ideally, it should increase S and decrease F and W . Obviously, such combined effects are difficult to implement with unilateral investments in weapons. There is, however, an alternative security arrangement that does not suffer from the negative effects of defensive weapons. When a player signs a defensive alliance with a third party, only her S payoffs are changed as military help will not be forthcoming should the player stage a predatory attack. Therefore, an alliance by which a country receives foreign military assistance only in the case it is attacked first, does not necessarily change any other payoff in the game. We briefly analyze such defensive alliances in the next section.
Defensive Alliances
Assume that when country i signs a defensive alliance with a third country, this third country enters the fray on i's side only if i suffers a surprise attack. Consequently, from the period after the attack, the payoff for the victim is modified from w to w + η and the payoff of the 
(ii) Under strategic uncertainty, unilateraly signing a defensive alliance increases the stability of peace. Formally,
On the light of this proposition, signing defensive alliances seems a much better bet than spending resources on defensive weapons systems. There is no scenario in which defensive alliances reduce the sustainability of peace. A unilateral signing is not beneficial under complete information, but this is a consequence of our starting assumption of symmetry. In an asymmetric pairing, if the weak party signed such an alliance, stability would increase.
Under strategic risk, defensive alliances are unambiguously good as they reduce preemptive incentives to attack while leaving predatory incentives fixed.
It is important to note that the current most important military alliance, NATO, is structured around the concept of a defensive alliance, with a common defense clause. Article Act that substituted the mutual defense treaty, the collective defense clause is explicitly avoided.
Conclusion
In Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2008), we show that the accumulation of offensive weapons for deterrence purposes has dramatically different effects under complete information and under strategic risk. In the case of defensive weapons, the differences are not as stark.
Even considering the preemptive motive for conflict that strategic risk imposes, defensive weapons can have an important negative impact on peace sustainability. Conversely, the signing of defensive alliances is always stabilizing under strategic risk, and it does not hurt the prospects for peace in any case.
Why do some countries then insist in the deployment of such weapons systems? A possible answer is that defensive alliances do not affect the initial cost of suffering a surprise strike and hence decision makers might feel political pressure to reassure their citizens that they cannot be harmed. Within the simple model we propose, this would only make sense if µ s is big, and it is precisely in these cases that, under strategic risk, defensive weapons systems might be stabilizing.
Many questions are left open by the simple analysis we pursue here. First, one might wonder whether offensive and defensive weapons are substitutes or complements in this framework. This might have important effects when we take the next step, which is the endogeneization of weapon stocks. Second, if we allow governments to invest in defensive weapons and in signing alliances, which one do they prefer? Finally, how does the simple analysis here relate to other settings? The main insight seems to be robust: in the context of crisis bargaining models, Powell (2003) shows that defensive weapons can easily have negative effects due to the increased assertiveness of the side that possesses them. 
